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The article discusses the conceptions of eudaimonia in the philosophy of Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics and argues against the growing tendency to make a 
sharp distinction between the ancient notion of eudaimonia and the modern notion of 
happiness. On the contrary, the traditional translation of eudaimonia as happiness is 
defended because it emphasizes the powerfulness of the challenge that the ancient 
eudaimonistic theories of ethics provide for our contemporary ways of thinking. 
Comparison with the ancient views encourages us to reject a purely subjective 
conception of happiness, defined with a reference to beliefs that one is getting the 
important things one wants and accompanying pleasant affects. The paradigm of 
happiness as subjective desire-satisfaction is shown to disregard the notion’s more 
objective aspects which can be uncovered by philosophical reflection.
At the beginning of his famous Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that his aim 
is to determine what the ultimate end or good is that human beings aim at in their 
lives (I 2, 1094a18–28). He spells out certain formal criteria that this final end 
should fulfill: it is something complete and self-sufficient, something we aim at 
for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. When we have reached 
this end, our lives are as good as they can possibly become; nothing further can 
improve our lives in any way.
Having presented some remarks on the formal specifications of the human 
good in the first three chapters of the first book of the EN, Aristotle says in Chapter 
4 that there exists a wide consensus between the majority of human beings 
and the philosophers on the proper term that should be used for this final good 
(1095a17–18). This term is the Greek eudaimonia and it has been conventionally 
translated as ‘happiness’.
In this paper, I shall discuss some views concerning eudaimonia in Greek 
philosophy, namely in addition to Aristotle, those of Socrates and the Stoics and show 
how virtues occupy a central place in all these views. I shall also ask whether these 
Happiness: Cognition, Experience, Language
13
Greeks were really speaking of the same thing as we currently do, when we speak of 
happiness. Furthermore, I shall disagree with the growing tendency to challenge the 
conventional translation and to find alternatives for it.1 Some philosophers refuse to 
translate the term eudaimonia at all, whereas others subscribe to meanings such as 
welfare, well-being, flourishing, and perfection. However, I belong to those who wish 
to maintain the traditional translation of eudaimonia as happiness, just because 
it emphasises the powerfulness of the challenge that the ancient eudaimonistic 
theories of ethics provide for our contemporary ways of thinking. I shall come to the 
conclusion that through interpreting the ancient eudaimonistic theories of ethics as 
theories of happiness, we can also clarify our own ideas of happiness in important 
ways. In the following I shall not aim at a comprehensive overview of ancient 
eudaimonism but concentrate on a particular variety of it. Despite their differences, 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics all subscribed to a type of eudaimonism in 
which the notion of virtue is central. There were other types, too. The Epicureans, 
for example, argued that eudaimonia consists of a certain kind of pleasure, but even 
they found a place for virtue in their ideal of eudaimonia.2
Let us, however return to Aristotle, who says: “Both the many and the cultivated 
call [the highest good] eudaimonia, and suppose that living well and doing well are 
the same as being eudaimon. But they disagree about what eudaimonia is, and the 
many do not give the same answer as the wise” (EN I 4, 1095a18–21). So lurking 
below the surface of the initial consensus there is a profound disagreement over the 
proper nature of eudaimonia. Some people think that eudaimonia is pleasure, others 
that it is honour and status, whereas others think it is fundamentally prosperity.
To Aristotle, all these views are in a way mistaken, but they also include 
elements that can lead us towards a correct understanding of eudaimonia. 
Aristotle now applies his standard method of saving the phenomena to popular 
views on eudaimonia. This means distinguishing between what is right and what 
is wrong with them and explaining why this is the case. This analysis helps us 
to construe a philosophical theory of eudaimonia that saves the advantages of 
earlier views and corrects their mistakes. Since these mistakes are explained and 
corrected with a reference to what is supposed to be acceptable for all, those who 
1 Those who reject ‘happiness’ as the translation of eudaimonia include Martha C. Nussbaum, The 
Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1986; David Charles, “Aristotle and Modern Realism”, in Robert Heinaman (ed.) 
Aristotle and Moral Realism, London: UCL Press 1995; L.W. Sumner, “Happiness Now and Then”, 
in Lawrence L. Jost and Roger A. Shiner (ed.) Eudaimonia and Well-Being. Ancient and Modern 
Conceptions, Kelowna BC: Academic Printing & Publishing 2002, 21–40. Those who favour the 
traditional translation include Terence Irwin in his translation of the EN (Indianapolis: Hackett 1985; 
Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, New York: Oxford University Press 1993; Richard Kraut, 
“Two Conceptions of Happiness”, Philosophical Review 88 (1979), 167–197.
2 On the Epicurean moral thought, see Annas 1993, 236–243, 334–350; Philip Mitsis, Epicurus’ 
Ethical Theory, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 1988.
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held the views criticised in this dialectical exercise are expected to change their 
view of the issue accordingly.3
Aristotle argues that human eudaimonia cannot be merely pleasure, even if a 
happy life is pleasant, since other animals also seek pleasure, whereas humans 
in fact aim at something in their lives that is proper for human beings and not 
for any other species. Eudaimonia cannot be honour and status either, although 
happy people are usually respected by others, since honour and status depend 
on the opinion of others, whereas our final good should be something that we 
are ourselves responsible for and that which is difficult to be taken away from us. 
Property cannot be equated with eudaimonia either, although a happy life requires 
at least moderate prosperity, since property is fundamentally a means we use for 
various ends, whereas eudaimonia is something we seek as an intrinsic good for 
the sake of itself and not for the sake of anything else.
Aristotle’s analysis has shown that there is pleasure, honour, and property 
in a happy life, but none of these things is sufficient to specify what eudaimonia 
essentially consists of. What we are looking for should, however, be something that 
is peculiar to human beings, something that we are ourselves responsible for and 
that is difficult to take away from us, and something that is sought for its own sake 
and not for the sake of anything else.
In the EN I 7, another candidate is chosen for discussion. What about virtue? 
Could we argue that eudaimonia fundamentally consists in living in accordance 
with a virtue or virtues? The term virtue is introduced in a very prosaic sense as 
referring to a disposition to fulfill one’s function in a reliable and appropriate way. 
I shall discuss some examples, all of which are not mentioned in this particular 
chapter but still are very much taken in an Aristotelian spirit. For instance, if the 
function of a knife is to cut meat, the virtue that makes this possible is sharpness. 
Similarly, if the function of a horse is to pull carriages and carry a rider, its virtue 
is speed and endurance. Another example is that if a function of a flute-player is 
to play the flute, his or her virtue is musical skill. According to Aristotle, it is not 
quite obvious that a human being as such has a function and a virtue in the same 
sense as artifacts, domestic animals, or artists and professionals. Finally, as a 
result of a rather complicated or even an obscure argument, the so-called function-
argument, Aristotle, nevertheless, draws the conclusion that the human being also 
has a peculiar function to act in ways only appropriate to human beings and not to 
any other species, i.e., rationally. Accordingly, we can also speak of human virtue, 
or virtues, as a disposition to realize the human function, and in Aristotle’s view, 
3 On Aristotle’s methodology G.E.L. Owen, “Tithenai ta phainomena”, in Jonathan Barnes & 
Malcolm Schofield & Richard Sorabji (ed.) Articles on Aristotle 1. Science, London: Duckworth 
1975, 113–126; Nussbaum 1986, 240–263; Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Dialectic and Inquiry in 
Aristotle, Helsinki: University of Helsinki 1993.
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eudaimonia for human beings can then preliminary be defined as “the soul’s activity 
that expresses virtue” (I 7, 1098a17).4
For the most part, the EN consists of Aristotle’s construction of a comprehensive 
theory of the virtues. These are divided into two groups, the virtues of character 
or moral virtues, such as courage, moderation, generosity, and justice, and those 
of intellect, i.e. practical reason and theoretical wisdom. Aristotle argues that all 
the virtues of both types presuppose each other and are taken together as being 
necessary for eudaimonia. Each virtue is, however, related to and expressed in 
its peculiar activities. There is a well-known controversy about which virtues are 
actually constituent parts of eudaimonia and which of them are merely necessary 
conditions.5 In the book X, Aristotle identifies eudaimonia with the activities of 
theoretical reason above all, whereas elsewhere he seems to argue that activities in 
accordance with all the virtues are intrinsically valuable parts in a flourishing human 
life. For the present argument, whether or not Aristotle’s views are inconsistent 
is not significant, nor whether the tension between the two ideals, practical and 
theoretical, can be eventually accommodated, since it is in any case obvious that all 
the virtues are at least necessary conditions if not constituent parts of eudaimonia.
It is, nonetheless, important to notice that Aristotle is not quite satisfied with the 
conclusions of the human function argument. He does not simply identify virtue 
and eudaimonia. For Aristotle, eudaimonia requires not only virtue but also what 
is referred to as external goods, such as friends, children, wealth, political power, 
and good looks. Having discussed the significance of the external goods, Aristotle 
revises his preliminary definition of eudaimonia, and states that “such person is 
eudaimon who expresses complete virtue in his activities, with an adequate supply 
of external good, not just any time but for a complete life” (I 11, 1101a14–16).
With respect to the external goods, a controversy arises concerning the correct 
interpretation of Aristotle. In one reading, Aristotle is interpreted as saying that external 
4 There is a wide variety of very different interpretations of the function argument in the EN I 7. 
See, e.g., Bernard Williams, “Aristotle on the Good – A Formal Sketch, Philosophical Quarterly 12 
(1962), 289–296; John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press 1975; Terence Irwin, “The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s 
Ethics”, in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.) Essays in Aristotle’s Ethics, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press 1980, 35–54; K.V. Wilkes, “The Good man and the Good for Man 
in Aristotle”, in Rorty 1980, 341–358; Martha C. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the 
Foundations of Ethics”, in J.E.J. Altham & Ross Harrison (ed.) World, Mind, and Ethics. Essays on 
the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995, 86–131. 
See also Juha Sihvola, “Aristotle and Modern Moral Realism”, in Jussi Kotkavirta & Michael Quante 
(ed.) Moral Realism, Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica 2004, 201–229.
5 See, e.g., Cooper 1975; Nussbaum 1986, 373–377: John M. Cooper, “Contemplation and 
Happiness: A Reconsideration”, Synthese 72 (1987), 187–216; Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the 
Human Good, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989; Juha Sihvola, “Why does Contemplation 
not Fit Well into Aristotle’s Eudaimonia?” Arctos 27 (1993), 103–121.
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goods are only valuable as conditions that make the exercise of virtue possible.6 This 
would in fact imply that virtue is not just necessary but also sufficient for eudaimonia, 
on the condition that it is possible to exercise it. According to this reading, friends are 
valuable merely because they make it is possible for a person to exercise the virtues 
of generosity and benevolence. The loss of a friend therefore prevents eudaimonia, 
but only because it deprives the person of a chance to exercise the virtues relevant 
in friendship. As an alternative reading, the external goods can be seen to have 
independent intrinsic value in the sense that, apart from their role as conditions for 
the exercise of virtue, external goods directly contribute to eudaimonia.7
Many modern commentators have found Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia to 
be strange, owing to the strong role it assigns to virtues. The ancient philosophers, 
however, disagreed with Aristotle from the opposite direction. Whatever stand we 
take on the controversy on the exact role of the external goods, it is clear that 
Aristotle’s position was that full eudaimonia is not possible without them. Aristotle 
referred to the King of Troy, Priam, who had lost his family, property and status when 
the Greeks sacked his city, and says that he “could not be said to be eudaimon 
suffering such a wretched finish” (1100a4–9). Only a philosopher maintaining a 
thesis at all costs could, in Aristotle’s view, call such a person eudaimon who has 
been weighed down by the greatest sufferings and misfortunes (1095b33–1096a2). 
And again later in the EN, “those who assert that the person broken on the wheel 
or encountering great disasters is eudaimon, if he is virtuous, are, intentionally or 
not, talking nonsense” (1153b19–21).
Aristotle is here probably referring to Socrates as presented in some of Plato’s 
early dialogues, especially the Euthydemus, in which Socrates discusses the nature 
of eudaimonia with a young man named Cleinias (278e–282d). Both agree on that 
all human beings want to be eudaimon, and being happy requires many good things 
that actually benefit us. Clenias suggests what these good things might be: health, 
beauty, power, and so on. This means that the starting point for the discussion seems 
to be very similar to that of the EN. Socrates, however, takes a much more radical 
break from the conventional conceptions of eudaimonia than Aristotle in the EN. 
Socrates argues that most people’s views are completely mistaken, not just vague 
and one-sided. Eudaimonia is only based on wisdom and virtue, not on any external 
goods. It is not health, beauty and power that make us eudaimon but what we do 
with them. Socrates’ conclusion is that virtue is the only thing that is really good, and 
what really matters in one’s life. Virtue is not just the necessary but also the sufficient 
condition of eudaimonia, whereas everything else is neither good nor bad.
6 See especially John M. Cooper, ”Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune”, Philosophical Review 94 
(1985), 173–197.
7 See Annas 1993, 364–384; Nussbaum 1986, 343–372.
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Aristotle finds the Socratic way to be too radical and detached from conventional 
conventions, but many philosophers in the Hellenistic times found the Socratic 
view to be much more congenial than the Aristotelian one. The Platonist Atticus, 
for example, argued in the late second century AD that Aristotle’s works on virtue 
included ideas that are “petty, groveling, and vulgar” (fr. 2) just because the sufficiency 
of virtue for eudaimonia was not accepted by him.8 It was, however, above all the 
Stoics that developed the Socratic view further, but it should also be mentioned that 
Plato too seems to have accepted the sufficiency of virtue for eudaimonia in his later 
dialogues, even though in other respects he rather drastically revised the views of 
moral psychology that were outlined in the Socratic dialogues. But the Stoics definitely 
held the view that virtue is the only thing that is really good and thereby contributing 
to eudaimonia, and vice is the only thing that is really bad and thereby prevents 
eudaimonia, whereas everything else, .i.e., everything that is external to virtue, 
is indifferent. The Stoics were emphatic that indifference did not mean irrelevant. 
They did not claim that the indifferents do not have any value; on the contrary they 
thought the indifferents to be valuable in a very important way, since they provide 
the material on which the human beings are assumed to direct their virtue. However, 
the value of indifferents is of a different type from that of virtue: the possession of 
indifferents does not contribute to eudaimonia in any way. The only thing that matters 
for eudaimonia is virtue, and it is both necessary and sufficient for it.9
Now what is the relation of the ancient philosophers’ eudaimonia to the modern 
notion of happiness? Here again, the scholarly opinions diverge. All scholars 
recognize the difference in contents between the ancient Greek notions of 
philosophical eudaimonia and the dominant modern ideas of happiness. But the 
question concerning the nature of happiness is a different issue from the question 
of whether the concept that is used is the same or not.
Richard Kraut has argued that the ancient theories of eudaimonia, especially 
Aristotle’s theory, are indeed theories of happiness, even though they are rather 
different ones from the dominant views in our own time.10 Our disagreement 
with the ancients is, in Kraut’s opinion, substantive and philosophical, but not 
conceptual or terminological. There are of course crucial differences between the 
ancient notion of eudaimonia and the modern notion of happiness. Aristotle and 
the ancients held that the fundamental standard of eudaimonia is objective: one 
8 On Atticus, see Fragments/Atticus. Texte établi et traduit par Édouard des Places, Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres 1977. See also Julia Annas, “Should Virtue Make You Happy”, in Jost & Shiner 
2002, 1–19.
9 There is a huge amount of recent scholarly literature on Stoic ethics, e.g., Annas 1993, 159–179, 
262–276, 388–411; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic 
Ethics, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994; Gisela Striker, “Following Nature. A Study in 
Stoic Ethics”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 9 (1991), 1–73; Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life. 




can only be happy if he has virtue, a feature that can be recognized independently 
of the happy subject’s attitudes. The dominant modern theory of happiness, on 
the contrary, claims that the standards of happiness are subjective: one’s life is 
happy if his or her desires are satisfied whatever they happen to be. However, 
Kraut argues that the ancient notion of eudaimonia also includes an ingredient that 
connects it to the modern notion of happiness in the concept of happiness. This is 
a positive attitude towards one’s life, and Aristotle and other ancient eudaimonists 
really held that a eudaimon person has this kind of attitude towards life. The 
ancients thought that a positive attitude follows from certain objective features in 
one’s life, whereas the moderns think that it is merely a result from one’s subjective 
feeling. Kraut concludes that there is only one concept of happiness at play here, 
but two competing substantive conceptions of the contents of that concept. The 
subjectivity of happiness is a suggestion concerning the contents of the concept, 
not an integral feature of the concept itself.
Kraut’s view is strongly challenged by Wayne Sumner.11 Sumner claims that 
in the modern parlance, subjectivity does not merely belong to the nature of 
happiness, but to the definition of the concept: whether a person is happy is 
determined not by any objective life conditions but by his or her own attitudes to 
it. In other words, a person’s happiness only requires that one believes that one 
is getting the important things one wants and these beliefs are accompanied 
by the pleasant affects that are normally connected to them. No virtues or any 
objectively defined standards need to be realized. To Sumner ‘we moderns’ 
cannot reasonably deny that there can be morally challenged people who are 
genuinely happy with their lives, if only they consistently believe that they are 
getting their desires satisfied and if they feel pleasure about these beliefs. It does 
not even matter whether or not the beliefs in question are false. One cannot, 
according to Sumner’s example, deny that a wife who is cheated on can be happy 
if she remains unaware of her husband’s unfaithfulness. If the ancient theories of 
eudaimonia deny the possibility that vicious or systematically deluded people can 
be happy, Sumner argues that these cannot be theories of happiness but they 
must be theories of something else, perhaps well-being.12
I do not find Sumner’s argument convincing. There are two problems. First, 
the subjective element is not completely missing from the ancient conceptions of 
eudaimonia. Sumner argues that the ancient eudaimonists accepted two claims:
11 Wayne Sumner,”Happiness Now and Then”, in Jost & Shiner 2002, 21–40.
12 Sumner’s view might sound rather crude as it defines happiness exclusively with a reference 
to desire-satisfaction and related subjective feelings without asking about the kinds of things that 
actually make people happy. But this is exactly his point: the modern view of happiness makes a 
very sharp distinction between the notion of happiness and the substantive contents of that notion. 
So he claims that despite the empirical correlations between the things that make different people 
happy, we all use the notion of happiness without reference to what makes us happy, even if we 
admit that most people are made happy by the same things. 
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(1) It is not possible that there is a person who is eudaimon but vicious.
(2) Having a positive attitude to one’s life (believing that one gets what one 
wants and feeling pleasure of this) is not sufficient for eudaimonia.
If we replace eudaimonia with modern happiness both claims become false 
in Sumner’s view. Since a positive attitude to one’s life is both necessary and 
sufficient for modern happiness, it is also possible that there are vicious people, 
namely those who have a positive attitude to their lives who are also happy in 
the modern sense. I do not contest that the ancient eudaimonists subscribed to 
claim (1). Vicious people cannot indeed be eudaimon in their view. The ancient 
philosophers would, however, not accept the second claim, but on the contrary, they 
would agree with the modern view of happiness that a positive attitude to one’s life 
is both necessary and sufficient for one’s happiness. Aristotle, for example, thought 
that life is pleasant if it consists of unforced actualizations of virtuous activities, 
whereas vicious or incontinent or even continent life is necessarily unpleasant.13 The 
subjective aspect of happiness, the positive attitude towards one’s life, is involved 
in the ancient notion of eudaimonia, as its necessary accompaniment, although not 
as a part of its essence. For Aristotle, a eudaimon life is pleasant, but it is not the 
pleasure that makes the life eudaimon. But if we think that the subjective feeling 
of pleasure or contentment has to be involved in happiness, there is enough of 
that dimension even in the ancient conception. For this reason, it is not misleading 
to translate the Greek eudaimonia as ‘happiness’, although it is also true that the 
ancient philosophers held that objective standards could be provided for happiness 
and these objective elements constituted the essence of eudaimonia.
What needs to explained is why the ancient eudaimonists thought they 
were entitled to deny the possibility of a vicious but happy person, even though 
simultaneously they thought that subjective positivity and happiness necessarily 
go together just as the so-called ‘we moderns’. The answer is straightforward 
and simple. The ancients made very strong assumptions concerning the natural 
sociability of human beings. This sociability included both natural moral sense, 
i.e., a capacity to recognize what constitutes the objectively flourishing human life, 
and natural moral dispositions to develop virtues aiming at the actualisation of the 
objective ideal of the good life. If these natural dispositions are actualised in an 
appropriate way, one’s life is both eudaimon and pleasant or subjectively satisfying. 
If they are not, one’s life may become, in an extreme case, vicious, or in less 
13 On Aristotle’s view of pleasure, see especially EN VII 11–14 and X 1–5. See also G.E.L. Owen, 
“Aristotelian Pleasures”, in Jonathan Barnes & Malcolm Schofield & Richard Sorabji (ed.) Essays 
on Aristotle 2. Ethics and Politics, London: Duckworth 1977, 92–103. The notions of continence 
and incontinence are discussed in EN VII 1–10. One is continent if one acts in the same way as the 
virtuous but without pleasure and having to suppress one’s non-virtuous desires. One is incontinent 




extreme cases, incontinent or continent. If one is vicious, incontinent or continent, 
one’s life is necessarily more or less disorganised and lacking the pleasure and 
contentment that is characteristic of a virtuous life. Philosophical anthropology, 
which was based on the idea of naturally sociable dispositions, rendered the idea 
of a psychopath with a positive attitude to his or her life more or less inconceivable 
for the ancient eudaimonists.14
There is, however, another, perhaps more serious problem with Sumner’s view. 
I am not sure whether ‘we moderns’ all subscribe to a purely subjective conception 
of happiness. Julia Annas, for example, has suggested that the modern idea of 
happiness is not so unambiguous after all.15 She proposes that the most common 
modern paradigm of happiness, the subjective construal of desire-satisfaction, 
omits the important and more objective elements which can be uncovered by 
philosophical reflection. She refers to studies in which people who have first 
defined happiness as desire-satisfaction are asked whether they think they would 
really become happy if they get what they desire (money, power, respect) merely by 
accident without any personal effort. The overwhelmingly negative answers seem to 
suggest that something like a notion of virtue is implicit in the respondents’ ideas of 
happiness, even though they are not necessarily immediately aware of this without 
reflection. Many of ‘us moderns’ after all seem to think that we can only become 
happy if we get our desires fulfilled in a certain specific way. We have to achieve 
what we desire through living a certain kind of life in which our personal activities 
and efforts play an important role. Annas’ view indicates that ancient eudaimonia 
and modern happiness are not that far from each other. Even though we currently 
hold less dogmatic views of our natural dispositions than the ancients, we still think 
that philosophical or intellectual reflection may make us more clearly conscious of 
our idea of happiness and bring forward more objective elements in it.
14 Sumner’s example of a happy wife completely unaware of her husband’s cheating may seem 
more difficult to explain. As far as I know, there are no examples of such a life led under a complete 
delusion discussed in ancient philosophy. But if Aristotle, for instance, had been made to face 
something like this example, he might have been able to say that such cases would be so unlikely 
that there is no need to reconsider the relation of eudaimonia and subjective pleasure.
15 Annas 2002, 18–19.
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